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INTRODUCTION

In 1981, in Mobile, Alabama, a black teenager named Michael
Donald was lynched1 by two members of the United Klans of
America ("UKA"), a Ku Klux Klan ("KKK") organization

1. The historical significance of the manner in which Donald was murdered cannot
be ignored. Lynching, a vicious practice to which blacks have almost exclusively been
subjected, has been defined as "an illegal death at the hands of a group acting under
pretense of service to justice, race or tradition." What Is Lynching? ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Apr. 28, 2002, at F7. See generally W.J. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH 43, 113-18, 122,
301-10 (Vintage Books 1991) (1941) (discussing the emergence of lynching in the South of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century). In response to hearing that a Mobile
County jury had been unable to reach a verdict in a case involving the murder of a white
Birmingham police officer by a black man, the UKA members went out and " 'drove
around looking for a black man to hang.' " Hays v. State, 518 So. 2d 749, 752 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1985) (quoting trial court's factual findings). They found Donald walking along the
road and abducted him, beat him until he was unconscious, cut his throat three times, and
hung his body from a tree in a residential neighborhood. Id. at 752.
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responsible for some of the most vicious crimes of the civil rights era. 2
In 1988, in Portland, Oregon, Mulugeta Seraw, a twenty-six year old
student from Ethiopia, was beaten to death on the sidewalk in front
of his apartment building by members of a Pacific Northwest neoNazi group called White Aryan Resistance ("WAR").3
In the
summer of 1995, 4 near Manning, South Carolina, Macedonia Baptist
Church was burned to the ground by members of the South Carolinabased Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.5
In addition to sharing the nomenclature "hate crime," 6 the
murders of Donald and Seraw and the burning of Macedonia Baptist
2. See Composite Complaint at 16-17, Donald v. United Klans of Am., No. 84-0725
AH Civ. (S.D. Ala. filed Aug. 19, 1985), available at http://www.splcenter.org/legal/docket;
see also MORRIS DEES & STEVE FIFFER, HATE ON TRIAL: THE CASE AGAINST
AMERICA'S MOST DANGEROUS NEO-NAZI 10 (1993) (recounting the Southern Poverty
Law Center's role in bankrupting the UKA and that organization's culpability for "some

of the most heinous crimes of the civil rights era"). Among other crimes, members of the
United Kans were responsible for the 1963 bombing of Birmingham's 16th Street Baptist
Church, in which four young girls were killed, and for the 1965 murder of civil rights
worker Viola Liuzzo. See Frank Judge, Slaying the Dragon, AM. LAWYER, Sept. 1987, at
83, 86-87 (describing the violent history of the United Klans).
3. See Amended Complaint for Wrongful Death at 4-5, Bernahu v. Metzger et al.,
No. A8911-07007 (Or. Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 2, 1990), available at http://www.splcenter.orgl
legal/docket; DEES & FIFFER, supra note 2, at 3-7.
4. In the mid 1990s there was a dramatic increase in the incidence of church
burnings. From January 1995 to June 1996, there were thirty-seven suspicious fires at
black churches in the South. William Booth, In Church Fires, a Pattern but No
Conspiracy, WASH. POST, June 19, 1996, at Al. See generally Church Burnings: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the U.S. Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (illustrating, through
the testimony of various church leaders, government officials, and religious advocacy
groups, the then-emerging problem of the burning of predominantly black churches). The
rash of church burnings in the South during this period led to the enactment of the Church
Arson Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-155, 110 Stat. 1392.
5. See Michael Dorman, Klansmen Guilty in Arsons, NEWSDAY, Aug. 15, 1996, at
A19. The men who burned Macedonia Baptist Church also admitted to setting fire to
Mount Zion AME Church in Greeleyville, South Carolina, and to stabbing a black man at
a bus stop in June 1995. Id.
6. "Hate crime" was previously defined as a crime against a person or property
motivated by bias against race, religion, ethnicity/national origin, or sexual orientation.
See Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, sec. 1, § 534(b)(1), 104 Stat.
140, 140 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2000)). The Hate Crime Statistics Act
of 1990 was amended by the enactment of the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 to include bias against disabled persons. See UNIF. CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM,
FED.

BUREAU

OF

INVESTIGATION,

HATE

CRIME

STATISTICS

1

(2001),

http:/lwww.fbi.gov/ucr/Olhate.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
According to the FBI's most recent compilation of information on hate crimes in the
Uniform Crime Reports, law enforcement agencies reported 9,730 bias-motivated crimes
in 2001. Id. at 5. As in previous years, the majority of reported hate crimes were racially
motivated, but an increase in hate crimes motivated by religion and ethnicity was noted.
Id. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, violence against Muslims and persons
of Arab descent has increased. Id.
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Church also share a common, powerful outcome. In both of these

cases, the victims' use of tort litigation led to the financial and
organizational ruin of the responsible hate groups.7 In Donald's case,

the jury in a federal civil lawsuit filed against the UKA and several of
its individual members delivered a verdict of $7 million for Donald's
mother.8 Unable to otherwise satisfy the enormous judgment, the
UKA was forced to transfer its national headquarters to Mrs.
Donald.' Among other facilities, the headquarters housed the private

offices of Robert Shelton, the Imperial Wizard of the United Klans.

°

In Seraw's case, a jury found that WAR, through its agents,
substantially encouraged the conduct of Seraw's killers and engaged
in a conspiracy that led to his death." In addition to $10 million

dollars in punitive damages, the jury awarded Seraw's family $2.5
million dollars in damages for Seraw's unrealized future earnings and
the pain and suffering he experienced during the beating. 12 As WAR
7. See generally Southern Poverty Law Center, Case Docket (describing several
cases in which the Southern Poverty Law Center used civil litigation to cripple some of the
largest white supremacist groups in the nation), at http://www.splcenter.org/legal/docket
(2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
8. Final Judgment and Order, Donald v. United Klans of Am., No. 84-0725 AH Civ.
(S.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 1987), available at http://www.splcenter.org/legal/docket; see also AntiDefamation League of B'nai B'rith, The Decline of the United Klans of Am., at
www.adl.org/issue-combating__hate/uka/decline.asp (2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
9. See William E. Schmidt, Black Is Handed Deed to Offices of Klan Group, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 1987, at A18. In addition to losing its headquarters, the United Klans has
also steadily lost its membership and seen a decline in its ability to operate on a large
scale. See Judge, supra note 2, at 89 (describing the statements of Irwin Suall, an expert on
the Klan with the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith: "[T]he Donald case has
already caused an 'erosion' in United Klans membership. 'Their fear that they may be hit
hard in their pocketbooks,' he explains, may ultimately change the way the Klan does
business."); see also Schmidt, supra (stating that the membership of the United Klans has
dwindled from about 30,000 in the 1960s to about 1,500 in 1987). See generally Craig
Whitlock, Little Left of Klan Except the Scary Name: Lawsuits and Changing Times Have
Eroded South's Most Infamous Hate Group, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar.
30, 1997, at A15 (describing the recent decline of the KKK).
10. Schmidt, supra note 9.
11. See Judgment at 2-3, Bernahu v. Metzger, No. A8911-07007 (Or. Cir. Ct. Oct. 25,
1990) [hereinafter Judgment], available at http://www.splcenter.org/legal/docket; DEES &
FIFFER, supra note 2, at 145-46 (describing the theories of liability employed against
WAR and its individual defendants); see also id. at 142-43 (including several pages of trial
exhibits used during the Seraw trial). On the fourth page of photographs located between
text pages 142 and 143 is a copy of a letter from defendant John Metzger seeking to "open
up communications" between his hate group, the Aryan Youth Movement, and East Side
White Pride. Id. This letter was the proverbial "smoking gun" linking the WAR
defendants to the Portland skinheads who murdered Seraw. Id. The jury awarded
Seraw's family $10 million in punitive damages. Id. at 272.
12. See Judgment, supra note 11, at 4-5. The amount of each damages award was
apportioned among WAR and the four individual defendants. Id. Metzger then mounted
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was unable to satisfy the multimillion dollar judgment, Seraw's family
was able to force the sale of WAR leader Tom Metzger's home and

personal property.13 The judgment in this case effectively bankrupted
WAR and rendered Metzger a "pariah" in the white supremacist

movement.14 Metzger has become a pariah due to a court order
allowing the Seraw plaintiffs to monitor Metzger's mail and seize half
of all money contained therein. 15 Because Metzger is subject to this

monitoring, he is no longer considered trustworthy within the white
supremacist movement, and his role therein has been greatly
diminished.16 While the American white supremacist movement is
not dormant, 7 WAR no longer occupies a position of influence in the
movement.18

Finally, and perhaps most dramatically, a South Carolina jury
returned a $37.8 million judgment against the Christian Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan for its role in conspiring to burn Macedonia Baptist
Church.19 Although a judge ultimately reduced the damage award to
' 20

$21.5 million, calling the $37.8 million judgment "unduly liberal,

the Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan was forced to relinquish

ownership of its headquarters in satisfaction of the judgment.2 1 The
property was eventually sold under a deed restricting the property
from being used for Klan or white supremacist activities in the
22

future.

While numerous state and federal laws provide for the criminal

an unsuccessful appeal to the United States Supreme Court, but he was ultimately
compelled to begin satisfying the judgment. See Bernahu v. Metzger, 850 P.2d 373 (Or. Ct.
App. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1106 (1994).
13. DEES & FIFFER, supra note 2, at 275.
14. See Little Money but Still a Big Victory, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 26, 1994, at C9.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See generally Southern Poverty Law Center, Active U.S. Hate Groups in 2002, at
http://www.splcenter.org/intel/map/hate.jsp (last visited Nov. 7, 2003) (featuring a map
illustrating the location and classification of various hate groups throughout the United
States) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
18. See id. (reporting on hate groups known to have actively participated in such
activities as rallies, publication of racist materials or criminal acts in 2002 and omitting any
reference to WAR).
19. See Verdict Form at 2, Macedonia Baptist Church v. Christian Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan, No. 96-CP-14-217 (S.C. Ct. Com. P1. July 24, 1998), available at http://www.
splcenter.org/legal/docket; see also Klan Must Pay $37 Million for Inciting Church Fire,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1998, at A7.

20. See Herb Frazier, Money Klan Groups Must Pay Is Cut, POST & COURIER
(Charleston, S.C.), Nov. 10, 1998, at 3B.
21. See Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 7.
22. Id.
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prosecution of hate'crime perpetrators,23 tort litigation of the kind
described above has emerged as a powerful complementary tool for
compensating individual victims and holding hate groups responsible
for the actions of hate crime perpetrators.2 4 With the future of
comprehensive national hate crimes legislation still uncertain,25 tort
litigation may offer victims of hate crimes individualized remedies
while also serving the indirect, but arguably equally important,
function of bankrupting and decentralizing violent organized hate
groups. While the legitimacy of the use of tort litigation for victim
compensation is well established,2 6 the use of tort litigation to disband
hate groups has raised serious questions regarding its tendency to
chill freedom of speech.

27

This Comment will explore the use of tort litigation in
compensating victims of hate crimes and decentralizing hate groups,
with an emphasis on determining whether the latter is a legitimate
goal of tort litigation. Part I of this Comment will describe how
organized hate groups encourage and finance the commission of hate
crimes. Part II will discuss specific tort theories and strategies that
23. See WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & URBAN AFFAIRS,
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL REMEDIES FOR HATE MOTIVATED VIOLENCE 10-38, 66-85, 100246 (Sept. 1999) [hereinafter WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE] (providing a

comprehensive summary of federal and state criminal statutes addressing hate-motivated
violence), at http://www.equalrightscenter.org/resources/Civil&Criminal.pdf

(on file with

the North Carolina Law Review).
24. The Montgomery, Alabama, based Southern Poverty Law Center pioneered the
use of civil litigation to bankrupt organized hate groups. For a description of the Center's
approach, see Morris Dees & Ellen Bowden, Taking Hate Groups to Court, TRIAL, Feb.
1995, at 22, 22, 24; see also Brian Levin, The Vindication of Hate Violence Victims Via
Criminal and Civil Adjudications, 1 J. HATE STUD. 133, 158-60 (2001-02) (describing
eleven prominent civil lawsuits against hate groups). See generally WASHINGTON
LAWYERS' COMMITEE, supra note 23 (providing a comprehensive summary of federal

and state criminal statutes addressing hate-motivated violence); Southern Poverty Law
Center, supra note 7 (providing brief descriptions of several cases in which the Center
used civil lawsuits to dismantle violent hate groups).
25. While most states have hate crime laws, Congress has yet to enact comprehensive
national legislation on the issue. See generally WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE,
supra note 23 (describing state and select federal statutes addressing hate-motivated
violence). However, Congress has enacted legislation in response to specific instances of
hate crimes. See, e.g., Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-155, 110
Stat. 1392 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) (addressing the specific
problem of church burning).
26. See generally MARSHALL S. SHAPO, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW § 71.03
(1999) (describing several rationales for providing injured individuals with compensatory

damages).
27. See, e.g., Jason Paul Saccuzzo, Bankrupting the First Amendment: Using Tort
Litigation to Silence Hate Groups, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 398 (2001) (arguing that the
use of tort litigation aimed at bankrupting hate groups is unconstitutional because it tends
to chill speech protected by the First Amendment).
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have proven effective when used to penalize hate groups for the
violent or destructive actions of their individual members. Part III
will examine the rationales and justifications for pursuing civil
remedies in addition to criminal penalties in the context of hate
Part IV will address the constitutional and pragmatic
crimes.
arguments opposing the use of tort law as a hate crime remedy.
Finally, Part V will argue that decentralizing hate groups is a
legitimate goal of tort litigation.
I. THE LINKS BETWEEN ORGANIZED HATE GROUPS AND THE
COMMISSION OF HATE CRIMES

There has been considerable debate concerning how and to what
extent hate crimes can be distinguished from ordinary crimes, such as
those motivated by pecuniary gain. Many commentators agree,
however, that in order for a criminal act to be designated a hate
crime, it must be motivated by prejudice, and there generally must be
a causal link between the act and the underlying prejudice.2 8 In
addition to this distinction, we can draw several other generalities
about hate crimes. First, hate crimes are much more likely to take the
form of violent personal assaults than other crimes. 19 They are also
more likely to involve physical injury.30 Finally, hate crimes are often
perpetrated by two or more offenders rather than a single
individual.3
Members of organized hate groups commit only about five
percent of all hate crimes in the United States.32 While this statistic
indicates that members of identifiable groups like WAR or the KKK
commit only a small fraction of hate crimes, it fails to reflect more
28. See, e.g.,

JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES:

CRIMINAL

LAW AND IDENTITY POLITICS 16-28 (1998) (identifying the prejudices that may motivate
hate crimes and discussing the causal links between prejudice and hate crimes in terms of
both the intensity of the prejudice and the degree of causation); FREDERICK M.
LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE:

BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 9-10 (1999)

(explaining that in order to classify a criminal act as a bias crime, the bias must constitute a
significant motivation for the criminal conduct).
29. JACK LEVIN & JACK MCDEvITT, HATE CRIMES: THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY

AND BLOODSHED 11 (1993) (discussing a study of hate crimes reported to Boston police
in which half of the reported crimes were assaults and comparing this proportion to that
found in ordinary crimes, in which seven percent of all crimes reported to police were
assaults).
30. Id. (explaining that about a third of victims of hate crime assaults need treatment
at a hospital for their injuries, as compared to seven percent for other kinds of assaults).
31. LEVIN & MCDEVITT, supra note 29, at 16. By contrast, most other violent crimes
are committed by lone individuals. Id.
32. Jack Levin, Hatemongers, Dabblers,Sympathizers and Spectators: A Typology of
Offenders, in THE HATE DEBATE, supra note 6, at 71, 73-74.
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indirect ways in which hate groups contribute to the problem of hate
crime. While some hate groups have openly directed their followers
to engage in violence,3 3 others have fostered violence in more subtle
ways:
[G]roups of white supremacists continue behind the scenes to
inspire murder, assault and vandalism.
They provide
propaganda to individuals looking to justify their own hateful
behaviour, train youngsters in the art of bashing minorities,
recruit on college campuses and prisons and workplaces, and
operate
cable-access
television programmes
featuring
interviews with one another. They encourage and support
much larger numbers of violent offences committed by nonmembers who may be totally unsophisticated with respect to
the ideology of hate: racist skinheads, alienated teenagers,
hate-filled young men looking to have a good time at someone
else's expense.34
By way of understanding the varying degrees to which hate groups
encourage or overtly mandate the commission of hate crimes,
consider the following cases.
A.

Michael Donald: A Direct Link Between the Hate Group and the
Crime
35
In 1981, Michael Donald was brutally murdered by Henry Hays
and James "Tiger" Knowles,3 6 two members of the UKA.37
According to Johnny Matthew Jones, a former Klansman in Hays's
unit, the impetus for the murder was the declaration of a second
mistrial in the case of a black man accused of murdering a white

33. For example, Tom Metzger's WAR telephone hotline featured the following
message on February 17, 1989: "A new law is being drafted called the Skinhead Law.
Anyone killing a black or a Jew gets an automatic death penalty in Oregon. That's okay!
Let's get it right out in the open and go for broke. The system plans to destroy all prowhite resistance, if they can." DEES & FIFFER, supra note 2, at 36.
34. Levin, supra note 32, at 74.
35. Hays was given a death sentence for murdering Donald, the first such sentence to
be imposed on a white man for the murder of a black man since 1913. Ex KKK Executed
for Black Slaying, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), June 7, 1997, at A2. Hays was
executed on June 6, 1997. Id.
36. Knowles was only seventeen years old at the time of Donald's murder. See Judge,
supra note 2, at 84. Because he pled guilty, he was sentenced to life in prison. Id.
Knowles was later an instrumental plaintiff's witness at the civil trial which resulted in the
$7 million verdict against the UKA. Id. at 83, 88-89.
37. See supra notes 1-2 (briefly describing the Donald murder and some examples of
the violent history of the United Klans).
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Birmingham police officer.38 Jones claimed that during a weekly Klan
meeting held prior to Donald's murder, Bennie Hays, a Klan "Great
Titan" in control of the group's activities in southern Alabama, told
his son [Henry Hays] to:
"[G]et this down: If a black man could kill a white man, a white
man should be able to get away with killing a black man." The
other Klansmen chortled in agreement. Jones remembered
that Henry Hays added, "A nigger ought to be hung by the
neck until dead to put them in their place. 39
Upon hearing news reports of the second mistrial,4" Henry Hays
and Knowles abducted Michael Donald, beat him until he was
unconscious, and hanged him by the neck from a tree visible from
Bennie Hays's front porch. 1
In order to understand the causal link between Bennie Hays's
statement at the weekly Klan meeting and the subsequent murder of
Michael Donald, it is necessary to understand the Klan's
paramilitary 42 structure. Because of the secrecy under which the
KKK has traditionally operated, there is little specific information
available on its exact organizational structure. Still, throughout its
history, writers and historians have revealed several of the KKK's
highest ranking positions and the persons occupying them. 43 As a
result, it has become clear that the Klan's high ranking officers are
responsible for directing the activities of its members.' In developing
38. See Judge, supra note 2, at 85.
39. Id.
40. The second mistrial was announced on the local news on the night of March 20,
1981. Hays v. State, 518 So. 2d 749, 751-52 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985).
41. See Alex Duval Smith, Electric Chair Closes Case of KKK Lyncher, GUARDIAN

(London), June 7, 1997, at 3 (describing how Donald was hanged from a tree "opposite
Benny Hays's porch").
42.

See

WEBSTER'S

THIRD

NEW

INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY

1638

(1993)

(defining "paramilitary" as "existing where there are no military services or existing
alongside the military services and professedly nonmilitary but formed on an underlying
military pattern as a potential auxiliary or diversionary military organization").
43.

See, e.g., J.C. LESTER & D.C. WILSON, Ku KLUX KLAN:

ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH,

AND DISBANDMENT 135-40 (AMS Press, 1971) (1884) (featuring appendices detailing the
prescript-or constitution-of the Klan, along with descriptions of the duties performed
by each of the Klan's officers). United Klans Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton, for
example, has received considerable attention from the media for his role in orchestrating
the Klan's violent opposition to the civil rights movement in the deep South in the 1960s.
See, e.g., Judge, supra note 2, at 87 (alluding to Shelton's involvement in orchestrating
attacks on Freedom Riders in Birmingham in 1961 and to inciting the murder of civil
rights worker Viola Liuzzo in 1965).
44. See, e.g., Judge, supra note 2, at 88 (describing James Knowles's deposition
testimony regarding the UKA's chain of command).

1140

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

the civil case against the UKA, Donald's lawyer, Morris Dees,4 5
convinced Bennie Hays's wife to turn over records detailing the
structure and constitution of the UKA.4 The records described in
considerable detail the military structure of the UKA and provided
insight regarding its chain of command.47 Although the official
constitution of the UKA contained no policy expressly encouraging
violence, the testimony of Klan members, some of whom had
knowledge of more than forty years of its history, illuminated a chain
of command through which violence against blacks had nonetheless
been ordered.4 8
According to Knowles, one of the men convicted of the Donald
murder, he took his orders from Bennie Hays, a Klan "Great Titan"
whom he claims suggested the killing. Bennie Hays, in turn, took his
orders from Robert Shelton,49 the Imperial Wizard of the UKA since
its formation in 1961.50 During the weekly meeting described above,
Henry Hays, a Klan leader known as an "Exalted Cyclops,"5 1 was told
not just to listen to, but to write down, a statement of Bennie Hays52
condoning the murder of blacks in retaliation for the pending
mistrial.53 When Bennie Hays learned of Donald's murder, he
appeared to be pleased, and is said to have commented that it was
54
going to look good for the Klan.
The Donald case thus illustrates a relatively direct connection
between hate group membership and the commission of a violent
hate crime. That Bennie Hays ordered Henry Hays to write down the
statement provides additional support for the view that, in making the
statement, Bennie Hays was authorizing his subordinates to carry out
the murder of a black person in retaliation for what he perceived as
45. See Donald v. United Klans of Am., No 84-0725 AH Civ. (S.D. Ala. 1987). For a
brief overview of Dees's work as a civil rights attorney and co-founder of the Southern
Poverty Law Center, see generally MORRIS DEES, A SEASON FOR JUSTICE (1991);
Southern Poverty Law Center, Pioneers of Justice and Equality (2003) (providing links to
biographies of the Center's co-founders, Morris Dees and Joe Levin), at
http://www.splcenter.org/center/about.jsp (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
46. Judge, supra note 2, at 86.
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. Id. at 88.
50. Id. at 86.
51. For a listing of the titles and hierarchy of Klan leaders and a general description of
the organization of the KKK, see Afro-American Almanac, Ku Klux Klan Organization
and Principles 1868, at http://www.toptags.com/aama/docs/kkk.htm (last visited Sept. 6,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).

52. See id.
53. See Judge, supra note 2, at 85.
54. Id. at 83.
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the injustice of the impending second mistrial.

Without the

cooperation of Bennie Hays's wife in turning over key Klan
documents, it might have been difficult to prove that Hays's
statement at the Klan meeting was anything other than hateful, but
otherwise harmless, rhetoric. Such language generally cannot give

rise to liability.55 However, Bennie Hays's statement on the night of
the Klan meeting, while possibly rhetorical in the abstract, assumed
the unmistakable character of an order communicated through the
chain of command when he asked his son and Klan subordinate to
write it down.
B.

56

Benjamin Smith: An Indirect Link Between the Hate Group and
the Crime

In 1999, twenty-one year old college student Benjamin Smith
shot and killed two people and injured nine others57 before

committing suicide. 8 Smith was a follower of the white supremacist,
neo-Nazi World Church of the Creator ("WCOTC"), s 9
advocates a general "RaHoWa" (racial holy war):

which

We gird for total war against the Jews and against the rest of
the goddamned mud races of the world-politically, militantly,
financially, morally and religiously. In fact we regard it as the
heart of our religious creed, and as the most sacred credo of all.
We regardit as a holy war to the finish-a racial holy war.6°
Smith first met WCOTC's leader, Matthew Hale,61 in the spring
55. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (establishing that the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech does not allow states to forbid advocacy of
the use of force except where it is calculated to incite imminent lawless action).
56. See Judge, supra note 2, at 85.
57. All of Smith's victims were black, Asian, Asian-American, or Jewish. See Bill
Dedman, Midwest Gunman Had Engagedin Racist Acts at 2 Universities,N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 1999, at Al (describing Smith's careful selection of only black, Asian, or Jewish victims).
58. Id. Smith killed Ricky Byrdsong, a black former Northwestern University
basketball coach, and Won Joon Yoon, a Korean student at Indiana University. Id.
59. For a general description of this white supremacist, neo-Nazi group, see
Southeastern Connecticut Gang Activities Group, Hate and Occult Group Information, at
http://www.segag.org/hatemain.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). For an overview of the WCOTC's growth nationwide, see
Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 7.
60. See Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Recurring Hate: Matt Hale and the
World Church of the Creator (quoting BEN KLASSEN, RAHOWA! THIS PLANET IS ALL
OURS 12 (1987) (emphasis added)), at http:www.adl.org/special-reports/wcotc/wcotcintro.asp (March 1998) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
61. Hale, the leader of the World Church of the Creator, is a 1998 graduate of the
Southern Illinois University School of Law. See Matt O'Connor, Hale Held in Plot To Kill
Judge; Professed Racist Grabbed by FBI Before Hearing, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 9, 2003, at Ni.
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of 1998 when Hale was recruiting on the campus of the University of
Illinois at Champaign-Urbana.62 During the year Smith spent as a
member of the WCOTC, he was recognized for his "service" to the
group 63

and often voiced his desire to use violence to advance the

goals of the WCOTC, a desire Hale claims to have discouraged. 64
Despite Smith's obvious involvement with the WCOTC and with
Hale, Hale has attempted to distance his group from the shootings by

pointing out that Smith had resigned from the group in May 1999,
prior to committing the crimes.65 The connection between Smith's
crimes and the advocacy of violence by the WCOTC would therefore
seem attenuated at best. Given the lack of evidence regarding a
direct order to commit murder through a formal chain of command,

the connection is less conclusive than was the connection between
Hays and Knowles's affiliation with the UKA and the murder of
Michael Donald. Still, the underlying philosophy of the WCOTC is
unambiguously violent.66 Specifically, the use of war metaphors and
phrases like "holy war to the finish" seems calculated to promote a
bellicose and violent mood among WCOTC's followers with regard to
other racial and minority groups.
The WCOTC, rather than taking the Klan's paramilitary
approach, has adopted "leaderless resistance,"67 a strategy which
Although he passed the Illinois bar exam in June 1999, shortly before the beginning of
Smith's Midwest shooting spree, Hale was denied admission to the Illinois State Bar.
Megan O'Matz, White Supremacist Loses Bid to Join Bar, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 1999, at C3.
A hearing board determined that Hale's racist views were irreconcilable with the Illinois
Bar's character and fitness requirements. Id.
62. Dedman, supra note 57.
63. See Kirsten Scharnberg et al., The Making of a Racist, CHI. TRIB., July 25, 1999, at
C1 (reporting that Smith had been named "Creator of the Year" for his aggressiveness in
recruiting new members and distributing WCOTC literature).
64. See Stephen Beaven, Benjamin NathanielSmith: Portraitof a Killer; Consumed by
Rage, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 22, 1999, at lA.
65. See Jim Nesbitt, Hate Groups Keep Practitioners at Arm's Length, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, July 18, 1999, at J1.
66. The WCOTC is not as well known as the KKK for advocating specific acts of
racially motivated violence, although its members have been accused of such acts on
several occasions. See generally Supremacist Guilty in Killing, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
July 30, 1992, at 4B (reporting the conviction of a WCOTC leader, George Loeb, for
murdering Harold Mansfield, a black sailor); Jodi Wilgoren, White Supremacist Is Held in
OrderingJudge's Death, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003, at A16 (reporting the arrest of WCOTC
"Pontifex Maximus" Matt Hale's arrest on charges that he had solicited someone to
murder a federal judge presiding over a copyright trial regarding his group's name, "World
Church of the Creator").
67. See generally Louis Beam, Leaderless Resistance, 12 SEDITIONIST (Feb. 1992)
(outlining the leaderless resistance approach for use by anti-government militia groups), at
http://www.louisbeam.comleaderless.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Beam is a prominent leader of the American white supremacist and neo-Nazi movements.
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relies "on hate groups advocating racial violence in abstract terms, a
constitutionally protected form of free speech that can be turned into
specific action by a lone gunman or a small group of racial
Hate groups implement this strategy by mounting
terrorists.""
massive propaganda campaigns targeting disgruntled individuals who
might be particularly receptive to their hate-filled messages 69 and
willing to act on them.7" When analyzed in the context of leaderless
resistance theory, Smith's careful selection of only non-white victims7 1
seems to be directly linked to the WCOTC's exhortation to its
members and to whites in general to pursue a racial holy war.72 The
dangerous brilliance of leaderless resistance theory, as illustrated by
the Smith shootings, is that it allows hate groups to mandate violent
actions, while using freedom of speech to insulate them from liability
when individuals act on the group's abstract advocacy of racially
73
motivated violence.
While it cannot be argued that any leader of the WCOTC
directly ordered Smith to start shooting blacks, Asians, and Jews as
part of the "RaHoWa," the violent implications of the group's
philosophy clearly supported such an action. It appears that Smith
deliberately chose his victims from among the groups Ben Klassen
vilified in his description of "RaHoWa. ''74 That Smith resigned from
the WCOTC shortly before going on his shooting spree is also
significant. In hate groups operating under a leaderless resistance
philosophy, it is standard practice for group members to dissociate
themselves from the group prior to taking violent action. 75 Because it
does not appear that any disenchantment with the WCOTC

See Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Extremism in America: Louis Beam, at
http://www.adl.org/learn/Ext US/beam.asp? xpicked=2&item=beam (last visited Oct. 29,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
68. Nesbitt, supra note 65.
69. See Levin, supra note 32, at 73-74 (describing in general terms the manner in
which hate groups use propaganda and other techniques to inculcate non-members with
the values of the hate group).
70. See Nesbitt, supra note 65 (explaining that "[t]hrough the Internet, shortwave
radio broadcasts and publications, an individual can plug into the racist philosophy of a
particular hate group and unilaterally decide to take violent action without receiving
specific instructions from group leaders").
71. See Dedman, supra note 57 (describing Smith's selection of black, Asian, and
Jewish shooting victims).
72. See Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, supra note 60.
73. See Nesbitt, supra note 65 (providing an overview of the application of leaderless
resistance theory to the operation of hate groups).
74. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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motivated Smith's resignation,76 it is reasonable to assume that his
reason for resigning was to protect the group from the possible
consequences of the violence he planned to commit.
It is important to understand the varying degrees to which hate
groups incite acts of violence.

It is only by establishing a sound

connection between the commission of hate crimes and the
corresponding advocacy of violence by hate groups that these groups
can be held accountable in tort litigation.77 Where highly organized
groups like the KKK are concerned, it is relatively simple to establish

civil liability by tracing violent mandates through an established chain
of command.7" However, with the emergence of leaderless resistance
and intentionally loosely organized groups, it may become more
difficult to hold hate groups civilly liable for hate crimes because
there is a careful avoidance of expressly advocating or condoning
such crimes.79
II. SUCCESSFUL CIVIL STRATEGIES

The establishment of some causal connection between hate
groups and the perpetrators of hate crimes has been crucially

important to the successful use of tort litigation against hate groups."0
The Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth a guiding principle for
understanding how these connections can give rise to liability:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct

of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act
in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with
him, or (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach
76. According to Hale, five days before Smith died, he dropped by to pick up some
WCOTC leaflets for distribution. Kirsten Scharnberg, FBI Agents Quiz Church Leader
Over Rampage; Investigators Look at Hale's Contact with Smith Before Attacks, CHI.
TRIB., July 8, 1999, at N1. Even though Smith officially resigned from the WCOTC in
April 1999, it is clear that he continued his affiliation with the group right up until the time
of his death. See id.
77. See generally Dees & Bowden, supra note 24 (describing the Southern Poverty
Law Center's civil strategies for holding hate groups accountable for hate crimes, several
of which depend exclusively on establishing a connection between the hate group and the
commission of the hate crime in question).
78. See Judge, supra note 2, at 88 (reporting Knowles's testimony regarding the
UKA's chain of command); see also Afro-American Almanac, supra note 51 (describing
the hierarchy of official positions within the KKK).
79. See Nesbitt, supra note 65 (discussing the application of leaderless resistance
theory to the operation of hate groups).
80. For an overview of such civil strategies, see generally SCOTT FREY, PRELIMINARY
REPORT: UNITED STATES CASE LAW RELATING TO THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF GROUPS

THAT PROMOTE VIOLENCE (Aug. 2001), available at www.auslaenderschutz-durchzivilrecht.de/en/usareport.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial
assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his
own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of
duty to the third person.8
This Section discusses the application of civil conspiracy, aiding and
abetting, and respondeat superior theories within the context of hate
crimes.
A.

Conspiracy

Where tortious acts are committed in furtherance of a common
design for "cooperation in a tortious line of conduct or to accomplish
a tortious end," the parties are said to be engaged in a conspiracy.82
In its case against Tom Metzger and the WAR defendants, the
Southern Poverty Law Center presented the theory of civil conspiracy
to the jury as a ground for establishing the connection between WAR
and the Seraw murder. 3 In order to prove a civil conspiracy in the
context of a hate crime, the plaintiff must establish the following
elements: (1) that the defendants agreed upon a course of action, (2)
that the purpose of the course of action was to encourage hate crimes,
(3) that the resulting violence advanced the course of action, and (4)
that the violence was illegal or tortious. 4 In the WAR case, for
example, liability was premised on the idea that Metzger dispatched
Dave Mazella to Portland to forge ties between WAR and the
skinhead gang East Side White Pride, members of which later
murdered Seraw. 85 Prior to Mazella's arrival in Portland, John
Metzger had written a letter to East Side White Pride, desiring to
"work with [them]. 8 6 The theory of WAR's liability was that WAR
and East Side White Pride entered into a tacit agreement to engage in
hate-motivated violence, that such violence, in the form of Seraw's
murder, occurred, and that the violence advanced the purposes
animating that agreement.

81.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 876 (1979) [hereinafter

RESTATEMENT].

82. Id. § 876 cmt. b.
83. Dees & Bowden, supra note 24, at 25-27.

84. Id. at 27. For a description of the more general elements of civil conspiracy, see
generally Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and Ryan v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 (D. S.C. 1981).
85. Dees & Bowden, supra note 24, at 25-27.

86. Id.
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Aiding and Abetting

The theory of aiding and abetting has also been instrumental in
establishing the culpability of hate groups in the context of hate
crimes. The Restatement illustrates the theory using the following
example: "A, a policeman, advises other policemen to use illegal
methods of coercion upon B. A is subject to liability to B for
batteries committed in accordance with the advice. '87 Under this
theory, a person who encourages another to commit tortious conduct
is responsible for the other person's act if the encouragement or
advice was a "substantial factor" in causing the tort.88 Take, for
example, Bennie Hays's statements at the Klan meeting preceding
Michael Donald's murder. 89 Although Hays did not expressly order
his Klan subordinates to commit murder, he clearly condoned the
murder of a black person as an appropriate response to "a black
man... [getting away with] kill[ing] a white man." 9 It is reasonable
to conclude that Hays's statement was a "substantial factor" in
causing Donald's death, since the Klansmen who killed him felt the
need to hang his body from a tree within view of Hays's front porch,9 1
presumably to signal to Hays that his suggestion had been carried out.
C.

Respondeat Superior

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can be
held liable for its employees' acts undertaken within the scope of
their employment.92 Hate groups are arguably more similar in their
structures to voluntary "civic" organizations than to traditional
employers, so the use of respondeat superior in civil proceedings
against hate groups is probably not common. Still, the doctrine bears
mentioning because a recent lawsuit netting $6.3 million against the
Idaho based Aryan Nations used repondeat superior to establish the
group's liability. 93
In the Aryan Nations case, three of the group's security guards
were convicted of aggravated assault in connection with an attack on
87. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 81, § 876 cmt. d, illus. 5.
88. Id. § 876 cmt. d.
89. See Judge, supra note 2, at 85.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 84.
92. For a description of the respondeat superior doctrine, see FREY, supra note 80
and accompanying text.
93. Judgment, Keenan v. Aryan Nations, No. CV99-441 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Sept. 8,
2000), available at http://www.splcenter.org/legal/docket. See generally Michael F. Leavitt,
Keenan v. Aryan Nations: Making Hate Groups Liable for the Torts of Their Members, 37
IDAHO L. REV. 603 (2001) (describing the litigation against Aryan Nations).
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a mother and son who had been driving by the group's compound in
rural Idaho.9 4 The mother and son had turned their car around in
order to recover a wallet that had been accidentally dropped from the
window.95 The defendants claimed that they heard gunshots, so they
followed the car and forced it into a ditch.9 6 One of the defendants
proceeded to strike the mother on the face with his gun and drag her
out of the car by her hair, while another held a gun to her son's back,
threatening to kill them.9 7 The defendants later admitted that they
"roughed up" the mother and son because they thought they were
members of a local Jewish group that opposed the Aryan Nations.9"
In deciding the case, the Idaho court undertook to determine
whether, under established agency principles set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, the security guards were acting
within the scope of their employment.9 9 Under the Restatement, the
conduct of an employee is generally considered to be within the scope
of employment if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs
substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it
is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master,
and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against
another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master."°
The plaintiffs prevailed in this case because they were able to
show that defendants acted within the scope of their employment and
on the authority of Richard Butler, the leader of the Aryan Nations,
when they chased the plaintiffs.0 l Because the defendants attacked
the plaintiffs while on duty just outside the compound, they were
acting "within the authorized time and space limits.""1 2 Furthermore,
the use of force was expectable to Butler, who had advocated
"extermination" of the Jews and had reason to believe that his
security guards would use force against persons they believed to be
trespassing Jews." 3
94. Leavitt, supra note 93, at 608.
95. Amended Complaint at 5, Keenan v. Aryan Nations, No. CV99-441 (Idaho Dist.
available at
Complaint],
Amendment
[hereinafter
1999)
24,
Ct. May
http://www.splcenter.org/legal/docket.
96. See Leavitt, supra note 93, at 608; Amended Complaint, supra note 95, at 5.
97. Amended Complaint, supra note 95, at 5.
98. Leavitt, supra note 93, at 609.
99. Id. at 620.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
101. Leavitt, supra note 93, at 621-22.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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In addition to these general tort doctrines, the liability of hate
groups may also be premised on various statutory or common law
provisions. For example, Oregon's wrongful death statute was one of
the bases for proceeding against WAR in the Seraw case."

III.

ARGUMENTS FOR PURSUING CIVIL REMEDIES THROUGH TORT
LITIGATION

Criminal prosecution is well-suited to administering punishment
to individual perpetrators of hate crimes.1 °5 However, the experience

of the criminal legal system for victims of hate crimes and their
families may prove unsatisfactory on several levels.

First, while

criminal prosecution imposes punishment on the actual perpetrator of
a hate crime, it often fails to root out and punish the hate group that
provided the impetus for the crime. This failure may be attributed to
a number of factors, including the strict burden of proof and rather
narrow discovery rules that inhere in criminal procedure.0 6

Second, criminal punishments are based primarily on the
attributes of the perpetrator, not the needs of the victim.

victim

impact

statements

may

influence

sentencing,0 7

While

the

determination of punishment is largely guided by predetermined
sentencing guidelines in federal court and the characteristics or
history of the person convicted, i.e., whether he or she has a prior
104. Dees & Bowden, supra note 24, at 24.
105. See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW
29-77 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the principles of punishment in the context of the criminal
law).
106. In criminal law, the prosecution is required to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-64 (1970); see also DRESSLER,
supra note 105, at 10-14 (providing an overview of proof beyond a reasonable doubt). In
addition, criminal discovery rules tend to be considerably stricter than civil discovery rules.
See

MYRON MOSKOVITZ,

CASES &

PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:

THE

COURTROOM 91-92 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining some of the differences between civil and
criminal discovery). In attempting to hold hate groups criminally liable, prosecutors are
restrained by the difficulty of proving a hate group's culpability beyond a reasonable
doubt, especially if an individual has already been convicted of the crime. Stricter
discovery may also prevent prosecutors from obtaining the information necessary to link a
hate group to a specific crime. For example, because depositions are usually not allowed
in criminal discovery, prosecutors may be unable to properly illuminate the often shadowy
or complex power structures of hate groups. See id. at 92.
107. See Phillip A. Talbert, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal
Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 203 (1988) (describing how information
provided in victim impact statements, including "the circumstances surrounding the crime
and the manner in which the crime was perpetrated, the identity and characteristics of the
victim, the effects of the crime on the victim and the victim's family, and the victim or
victim's family's opinion of the defendant and of an appropriate sentence," can influence
the ultimate sentencing decision).
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As such, the criminal sentences levied on hate

crime perpetrators often fail to reflect the input or objectives of hate
crime victims, such as a possible preference for punishment in the
form of restitution or community service instead of jail time °9 or a
desire to purge vengeful feelings by participating in decisions
regarding the punishment of the person or persons who wronged

them.1 °
Third, victims and their families have little, if any, control over
the operation of criminal prosecutions. While victims may serve as
instrumental prosecution witnesses, and they and their families may
provide testimony influencing the sentencing of hate crime
perpetrators,"' the extent to which victims and their families are
empowered by the process of criminal prosecution is limited.
Empowering victims to participate in the criminal justice process is
important in the context of violent crime, but because of the criminal
law's focus on the rights and needs of defendants and the idea that
the crime is against society generally, there are few opportunities for
such empowerment.' 12 Because tort plaintiffs sue to vindicate their
own interests, retain attorneys of their own choosing, and have
considerable input into the manner in which their cases are presented,
hate crime victims and their families are necessarily more empowered
by the process of tort litigation than that of criminal prosecution.
Finally, hate crime prosecutions are unlikely to raise public
consciousness about the problem of organized hate unless the crimes
were particularly heinous, involved someone of notoriety, or, more
importantly, involved a clear connection between the crime and a
108. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (listing seven considerations guiding
sentencing, including the nature of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant; the types of sentences available; the type of sentences and sentencing ranges
established for the particular offense, and the need to avoid sentence disparities between
defendants with similar records or who have been convicted of similar crimes); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1340.13 (2001) (providing that for sentences imposed for felony convictions,
the judgment of the court should contain a minimum sentence determined with respect to
the class of the offense and the prior record level of the offender).
109. See Susan E. Gegan & Nicholas Ernesto Rodriguez, Victims' Roles in the Criminal
Justice System: A Fallacy of Victim Empowerment? 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
225, 233-34 (1992) (describing a 1978 study in Dade County, Florida, in which victims
participated in pretrial conferences and explaining that in one of the three test
courtrooms, the rate of incarceration was reduced as a result of victims preferring
sentences that required community service or restitution).
110. See id. at 236 (explaining that victims may experience a constructive form of
catharsis by participating in plea-bargaining negotiations).
111. Id.
112. See id. at 225 (examining victims' roles in the criminal justice system and
advocating state constitutional amendments supporting victims' rights).
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hate group. It may be very important to the victims of hate crimes
and their families to use their stories to educate the general public
about the activities of the hate group responsible for the crime. 3
Unlike a murder, assault or vandalism trial, the impact of which might
be diluted by the sheer number of similar trials, a civil lawsuit
demanding millions of dollars in damages may command a great deal
of attention. Consider, for example, the Donald lawsuit against the
UKA. While the criminal trial of Henry Hays garnered much local
attention, it was Mrs. Donald's victory in the civil suit that ultimately
grabbed national headlines and placed a spotlight on her son's violent
death and the hate group responsible for it." 4 Predictably, the civil
lawsuit resulting in an elderly black woman taking title to the national
headquarters of one of the most violent KKK groups in history was
much more widely reported than Hays's criminal conviction for the
murder. Had Mrs. Donald been satisfied with Hays's conviction
alone, history might have recorded her son's death as a garden variety
robbery-murder, which, though horrible, would have failed to
highlight the murderous consequences of white supremacists' vicious
race hatred.
The publicity objective may be frustrated still further by the
proliferation of plea-bargaining, which has become a common
method of disposing of criminal cases." 5 If the perpetrator of a hate
crime opts to plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in order to
avoid trial or a more severe punishment, publicity surrounding the
crime, the perpetrator, and the culpability of the hate group may be
virtually nonexistent.
The criminal legal system is therefore not the best forum in
which to address the full scope of the injuries of individual hate crime

113. For Beulah Donald, this goal must have been an important part of her civil lawsuit
against the UKA. Investigators did not initially believe her son's murder was motivated
by racial hatred. Rather, they speculated that his murder was drug-related. See Damon
Henderson Taylor, Civil Litigation Against Hate Groups: Hitting the Wallets of the
Nation's Hate-Mongers, 18 BUFF. PUB, INTEREST L.J. 95, 129 (2000).
114. Mrs. Donald's lawsuit has been credited with bringing down the Klan in Alabama.
See Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, supra note 8 (acknowledging Mrs. Donald's
victory in her lawsuit as the "beginning of the end" for Alabama's United Klans of
America). The lawsuit made her such a recognized figure that her obituary and the story
of her struggle against the Klan appeared in the Chicago Tribune when she died. Beulah
Donald, "Woman Who Beat the Klan", CHI. TRIB., Sept. 19, 1988, at C7.
115. See generally UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES
MANUAL, ch. 1, (A)(4)(c) (Nov. 2002) [hereinafter SENTENCING COMMISSION,
GUIDELINES MANUAL] (stating that "[n]early ninety percent of all federal criminal cases

involve guilty pleas and many of these cases involve some form of plea agreement"),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/2002guid/2002guid.pdf.
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victims or the true culpability of the hate groups that may have
sponsored the crimes. These functions are best served by the civil
legal system's application of tort law, which is structured to facilitate
both the compensation of injured individuals and the imposition of
punishment on wrongdoers.' 6 Because tort law, unlike the criminal
law, is not primarily concerned with attending to the interests of
society as a whole," 7 it is able to offer plaintiffs a more flexible
framework within which to pursue individualized remedies.
Tort litigation serves many practical purposes, including
"vindication of certain personal rights,"'' 8 compensation of wronged
parties," 9 acknowledgement of the ability of actors to control the
activities and lives of others, 120 punishment, and/or retribution. 2 '
Alongside these practical rights, however, there is another purpose of
tort litigation that is anchored in the concept of individual dignity and
equality. This purpose of tort litigation is best understood with
reference to Professor Leslie Bender's vision of tort law as a tool for
social justice.1 22 According to Professor Bender, tort law is an
especially appropriate medium for those injured by social injustice
and dignitary harms because it empowers victims to make important
choices about whether and how to present their claims and provides
them with opportunities to publicly air their grievances:
Injured parties are empowered by their access to a public forum
and the judgment of community members in the halls of
justice .... Tort law empowers injured parties to call the harm-

116. See SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT LIAB. SYS., AM. BAR ASS'N, TOWARDS A
JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY:
THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF
SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 4-171 to 4-172 (1984) [hereinafter
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION] (stating that "it seems clear that a punishment rationale

is firmly fixed in the law of torts, if for no other reason than its appearance, both explicitly
and implicitly, in many decisions awarding punitive damages"); see also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 81, § 901 cmt. c (identifying punishment as one of the purposes of punitive
damages).
117. See SHAPO, supra note 26, at
1.04 (explaining that "[s]ome theorists have
insisted that the principal goal of tort law is to achieve corrective justice between
individuals, without reference to 'broader social considerations' "); see also id. 1.01
(pointing out as a crucial distinction between tort law and criminal law the fact that
criminal prosecutions are brought by the State in order to "vindicate the interests of
society as a whole").
118. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 116, at 3-1.
119. Id. at 4-29.
120. Id. at 4-116.
121. Id. at 4-170.
122. See generally Leslie Bender, Tort Law's Role as a Tool for Social Justice Struggle,
37 WASHBURN L.J. 249 (1998) (discussing the conception of tort law as a tool for the
vindication of personal dignity and as a means for achieving social justice).
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causing defendants to court and to require them to justify
themselves and defend their actions .... Tort provides injured
parties with court-ordered remedies and even more importantly
with a public acknowledgement that they were wronged. A tort
judgment can psychologically vindicate and emotionally
validate plaintiffs' or defendants' senses of fairness and justice.
Tort judgments assessing liability against defendants for
blameworthy conduct also have reverberating social and
reputational consequences which often satisfy injured plaintiffs'
desires for punishment or vengeance.123
Professor Bender's vision of the tort law describes a medium
well-suited to the needs of hate crime victims, a medium in which it is
possible for victims to make tactical decisions and to expose their
assailants to the moral judgment of the community. It is this vision of
tort law that allows hate crime victims to preserve their personal
dignity by taking control of the process by which responsible hate
groups may be held accountable for causing them pain.
In addition to the personal dignity rationale, three practical
rationales support the use of tort litigation in the context of hate
crimes; each is rooted in distinctions between the criminal and civil
legal systems. 124 First, while civil litigation often results in punishment
for wrongdoers, one of its primary functions is compensating the
victim of a wrong. 125 Because of the focus on victims of wrongdoing,
civil litigation may provide individualized remedies of more direct
and personal significance to hate crime victims than does criminal
1 26
prosecution, which focuses primarily on punishing the wrongdoer.
Second, civil penalties often take the form of money damages.
The "work" of a hate group is unlikely to be disrupted by the criminal
conviction of one, or even several, of its members. 127 However, the
123. Id. at 259.
124. For a general analysis of the distinctions between civil and criminal law, see
generally Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-CivilDistinction and the Utility of Desert, 76
B.U. L. REV. 201 (1996).
125. See generally id. (discussing the "pricing" of conduct under civil law).
126. See SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 115, at
ch.l(A)(2) (identifying the purposes of criminal punishment as "deterrence,
incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation"-all of which focus on the
perpetrator).
127. Consider, for example, the unabated violence orchestrated by the Ku Klux Klan in
the 1960s in the South. See Composite Complaint at 10-11, Donald v. United Klans of
Am., No. 84-0725 AH Civ. (S.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 1985) (describing incidents of violence
carried out by the United Klans during the civil rights movement), available at
http://www.splcenter.org/legal/docket; JOHN TURNER, ET AL., SPECIAL REPORT: THE Ku
KLUX KLAN: A HISTORY OF RACISM AND VIOLENCE 29 (1981) (listing in detail fortyfour of the violent incidents perpetrated by the Klan in the late 1950s and 1960s). Despite
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imposition of money damages has the potential, in some cases, to
2
bankrupt the group entirely and thereby limit its ability to function.
If the goal of the hate crime victim as tort litigant is to decommission
the responsible hate group,129 there are few better ways to accomplish
that goal than by pursuing the group's financial assets. Because that
goal is not readily achievable in the criminal legal system, the civil
legal system provides hate crime victims with a natural alternative
forum in which to realize the goal.
Third, tort litigation may offer the most amenable procedural
environment for holding organized hate groups accountable for
advocating violent actions on the part of their members. Because
civil standards of proof are less stringent and discovery rules are
the arrest and conviction of several Klan members, there seemed to be a steady supply of
replacements willing to undertake violent actions. The murder trials of Klansmen indicted
for killing blacks or civil rights workers-such as that of the Klansman indicted for the
murder of Viola Liuzzo-often ended in acquittals, so it is likely that the steady supply of
replacements were emboldened by the apparent unwillingness of their communities to
punish Klansmen for their violent actions. See DAVID CHALMERS, BACKFIRE: HOW THE
Ku KLUX KLAN HELPED THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 64-65, 78-81 (2003) (reporting
the acquittals of various Klansmen in a number of murder trials involving victims who
Were either black or involved in civil rights work). However, even after the Justice
Department began prosecuting, and obtaining criminal convictions against, the previously
acquitted Klansmen for offenses such as conspiracy to deny civil rights, Klan violence
continued. See id. at 77-86 (describing the Justice Department's prosecutions for
conspiracy to deny civil rights and reporting contemporaneous bombings of synagogues
and the homes of various civil rights workers).
Apparently, the specter of criminal conviction was similarly no deterrent to Henry
Hays and his accomplices when they murdered Michael Donald in 1981. Just four years
earlier, Klansman Robert Chambliss had been convicted of four counts of first-degree
murder in connection with the 1963 bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church.
Chambliss v. State, 373 So. 2d 1185, 1187-88 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979); Bill Richards &
Andrew Kilpatrick, Alabamian is Guilty in 1963 Fatal Bombing, WASH. POST, Nov. 9,
1977, at Al. Like Donald's murder, the trial of Robert Chambliss took place in Alabama,
so it is unlikely that the fact of Chambliss's conviction would have escaped the attention of
Hays and his Klan associates. Still, the almost contemporaneous demonstrated willingness
of the State of Alabama to punish Klan crimes apparently did not sway the Klansmen
from their decision to murder Donald.
128. See supra notes 7-22 and accompanying text (describing the crippling effects of
multi-million dollar civil judgments on the UKA, WAR, and the Christian Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan). White supremacists are concerned about the impact of legal action on
their ability to operate. See NATIONALIST MOVEMENT LEGAL DEF. FUND, THE EFFECT
OF LEGAL ACTION ON RIGHTIST ORGANIZATIONS (2002) (warning "would-be
rightists ... undertaking controversial activity to obtain competent legal counsel" and
providing a table describing the impact of state and federal criminal and civil proceedings
against hate groups), at http://www.nationalist.org/docs/law/action.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); see also Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 17
(describing the Nationalist Movement as an active hate group).
129. See text accompanying notes 105-23 (discussing the legitimacy of hate group
decentralization as a goal of tort litigation).
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broader than those in the criminal context, it is easier for plaintiffs to
survive procedural challenges and, eventually, win on the merits. In
order for the finder of fact in a civil case to hold a defendant liable for
a tort, it must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed all of the elements constituting a particular
tort. 130 By contrast, in a criminal trial, the finder of fact must be
convinced "beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime ... charged" in order to convict an accused
person.'
Additionally, information emerging from the broader civil
discovery process has the potential to lead to further criminal
prosecutions in connection with hate crimes. In one dramatic
example, Bennie Hays, the "Great Titan" of the UKA group
responsible for the Donald murder, and Frank Cox, Henry Hays's
brother-in-law, were each indicted for conspiracy to commit murder
as a result of information concerning the UKA's structure and chain
of command that surfaced during the course of the Southern Poverty
13 2
Law Center's investigation.
Responding to hate-motivated violence by pursuing tort
litigation, in addition to criminal prosecution, is therefore justified not
only by the inadequacies of the criminal system to address the full
range of injuries flowing from hate crimes, but also by the particular
strengths of the civil system to facilitate achievement of the hate
crime victim's highly individualized goals in proceeding against their
assailants. To the extent that decentralizing the responsible hate
group is an objective of hate crime victims, tort litigation provides an
efficient and constructive way of achieving that objective.
IV.

COUNTERARGUMENTS

Although there are sound arguments for using tort litigation as a
means of breaking apart hate groups, not everyone agrees that tort
130. See generally Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On JudicialProofand
the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1364 n.22 (1985) (quoting typical
jury instructions in a civil action: "[t]o 'establish by a preponderance of the evidence'
means to prove that something is more likely so than not so").
131. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
132. See Judge, supra note 2, at 15 (explaining that the grand jury relied on information
uncovered by the Southern Poverty Law Center in indicting Cox and Hays for Donald's
murder); see also Cox v. State, 585 So. 2d 182, 185 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (briefly
discussing the indictments against Cox and Hays). Cox was convicted of conspiracy to
commit murder and sentenced to ninety-nine years in prison for providing the rope with
which Donald was hanged. Cox, 585 So. 2d at 184. Hays was also charged with conspiracy
to commit murder, but he died of a heart attack before his trial could be completed. See
Gita M. Smith, Alabama Case Showed How Father'sSins Were Visited on Son, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., June 8, 1997, at A4.
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litigation should be aimed specifically at the elimination of hate

groups. The opposition is based primarily on the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech133 and the perception that tort
litigation against hate groups tends to threaten their protected speech.
Additionally, the decentralization of hate groups might actually
encourage the proliferation of violent leaderless resistance. This
Section describes and responds to these arguments.
A.

The FirstAmendment

There are many rationales for the First Amendment's protection
of freedom of speech: promotion of the discovery of truth,134
exposure and restraint of abuses of authority,135 personal dignity,'36
the promotion of tolerance,137 and the creation of a "marketplace of
ideas."'3 8 Whatever the basis for its protection, it is well settled that
the protection of freedom of speech provided by the First
Amendment is not absolute in scope.'39
Among the limitations on the freedom of speech 40 is the
principle that the freedom does not allow speakers to incite imminent
violence with impunity. 4' The advocacy of violence by hate groups
133. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ...abridging the
freedom of speech ....).
134.

See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 16-24

(1989).
135. See id. at 25-26.
136. See id. at 27-28.
137. See id. at 29. See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986)
(discussing the capacity of freedom of speech to make society more tolerant of diverse
ideas).
138. See GREENAWALT, supra note 134, at 34.
139.

See generally HARRY KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION:

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

IN AMERICA 23-236 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988) (discussing various restrictions on freedom
of speech including libel, obscenity, incitement to violence, and subversive advocacy).
140. For example, the freedom cannot be used for the purpose of inciting violence, see
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), defaming private persons, see Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14 (1990); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340
(1974), or disseminating obscene materials, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see also KALVEN, supra note 139,
at 106-18 (specifically discussing the implications of Chaplinsky). Exercise of the freedom
is also limited by various time, place and manner restrictions. See, e.g., Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (holding that states "may by general and nondiscriminatory legislation regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon
its streets, and of holding meetings thereon; and may in other respects safeguard the
peace, good order and comfort of the community"); Glasson v. Louisville, 518 F.2d 899,
904 (6th Cir. 1975) (explaining that "[ajlthough the content of a communication may be
protected, the state may, in some circumstances, regulate the time, place and manner of
expressing it").
141. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
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has been one of the central concerns of tort litigation aimed at
dismantling the groups. 142 The opponents of this use of tort litigation
argue that much of the hate speech that has been targeted for
litigation constitutes mere advocacy of, rather than incitement to,
violence. Because mere advocacy of violence is protected speech,
opponents argue, tort litigation aimed at silencing the violent rhetoric
of hate groups violates the First Amendment. 43
In a report on American case law regarding the civil liability of
hate groups that promote violence, Scott Frey addressed several cases
that illuminate some of the case law bases for this argument against
the use of tort litigation as a tool for decentralizing hate groups. 144 In
addition to citing Brandenburg's "incitement to imminent lawless
action" standard for restricting hate speech,'145 Frey addressed the
more recent case of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,146 in which
the Supreme Court held that an organization cannot be held liable for
violence occurring in reaction to a speech by a member of the group
unless the group "authorized-either actually or apparently-or
ratified unlawful conduct.' 1 47 Claiborne Hardware thus places a
heavy burden on plaintiffs wishing to establish speaker liability, and it
would seem to leave hate groups with wide latitude to espouse violent
rhetoric that stops just short of authorizing violent conduct.
The lower courts have not necessarily been consistent in their
application of the Brandenburg and ClaiborneHardware principles. 4 8
Frey points to two cases in which district courts "ruled one way on
Brandenburg/ClaiborneHardwareissues, and the appellate court then
reversed."' 49 In the first case, Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 5 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower court ruling and
held that freedom of speech did not protect a publisher of a book
detailing how to commit murders-for-hire from liability for three
142. See, e.g., supra notes 28-79 and accompanying text (discussing the connections
between hate group rhetoric and the corresponding commission of violent crimes).
143. See, e.g., Saccuzzo, supra note 27, at 398 (arguing that the use of tort litigation
aimed at bankrupting hate groups is unconstitutional because it tends to chill speech
protected by the First Amendment); see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)
(holding that advocacy of violent action at some indefinite point in the future is
insufficient to allow the State to punish the speech).
144. See FREY, supra note 80, at 53 (discussing some of the cases regarding freedom of
speech and the advocacy and/or incitement of violence).
145. See Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447.
146. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
147. FREY, supra note 80, at 53.
148. See id.

149. Id.
150. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).

2004]

DECENTRALIZING HATE

1157

brutal murders committed in conformity with the book. 15' The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals took the opposite position in Planned
Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coalition
of Life Activists, 15 2 and held that a website equating abortion doctors
with war criminals and listing the names and addresses of doctors
supporting abortion (with the names of those doctors who had been
murdered by anti abortion activists struck through) was protected by
the First Amendment because it "merely encouraged unrelated
terrorists," rather than threatening that ACLA members themselves
53
would do violence.
Despite the inconsistencies across the circuits, it is clear that the
First Amendment protects speech falling short of inciting imminent
lawless action.'5 4 Although the First Amendment may protect hateful
rhetoric to a certain extent, it loses this protection when a plaintiff
shows that hate groups have taken physical steps to prepare for
violence.'55 By pointing to such preparations for violence, tort
litigants have been able to sidestep the inevitable First Amendment
defenses raised by hate group defendants in lawsuits alleging a
connection between hateful rhetoric and the commission of a violent
crime. Because such tort doctrines as conspiracy and aiding and
abetting require some action in addition to speech, the hate groups'
First Amendment argument is inapposite. It is undoubtedly true that
hate groups cannot be held liable for merely advocating violence,
because precedent has amply established that this speech is
protected.'56 But, it is equally true that liability can be imposed if
such incitement leads to actual violence facilitated by group members
trained or encouraged to commit violent acts. Tort litigation against
hate groups does not seek to punish their speech but rather the
violent acts causally flowing from their speech. As Morris Dees and
Ellen Bowden state, "People have a right to hate in our country, but
not a right to lead others to hurt." '57 To the extent that the argument
151. Id. at 267.
152. 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001).
153. Id. at 1015.
154. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
155. Dees & Bowden, supra note 24, at 27. See generally Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290 (1961) (stating that abstract advocacy of violence is different than preparation for
violent activities).
156. See, e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (explaining that the First Amendment
protects advocacy of the use of force except to the extent that it incites or produces
imminent lawless action or is likely to do so); Planned Parenthood of the
Colombia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1072 (9th Cir.
2002) (acknowledging that the First Amendment protects the advocacy of violence).
157. Dees & Bowden, supra note 24, at 28.
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against tort litigation focuses on speech alone, it fails to encompass
the full range of activities such litigation seeks to curtail: speech
which facilitates some manner of instruction or encouragement to
commit a violent crime.
B.

Leaderless Resistance

In addition to the First Amendment-based counterargument,
there is a legitimate argument that decentralizing hate groups through
financially crippling tort litigation may drive hate groups
underground and lead to an explosion in the violence arising from
leaderless resistance. Leaderless resistance first found a voice in the
white supremacist movement in 1992 with the publication of an essay
158
by Louis Beam in his self-published periodical, The Seditionist.
Beam described leaderless resistance as an organizational structure in
which "all individuals and groups operate independently of each
other, and never report to a central headquarters or single leader for
direction or instruction."15' 9 In the essay, Beam advocated the use of a
"cell" organizational structure rather than the traditional pyramid
organization of hate groups, in which a leader occupies the top of the
pyramid and delegates duties to foot soldiers at the bottom.1 60 Under
the "phantom cell" mode of organization advocated by Beam, there is
no central leader of resistance groups; rather, like-minded individuals
respond to information distributed by the independent cells as they
161
see fit.
Several prominent recent crimes have been carried out under the
theory of leaderless resistance, most prominently the April 19, 1995,
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, in which
168 people were killed. 62 Throughout his trial and incarceration for
the bombing, Timothy McVeigh never implicated any of the
paramilitary groups he had been affiliated with in the past; rather, he
claimed sole responsibility for carrying out the bombing. 163 McVeigh
158. See supra note 67 (describing Beam's essay and his position of influence within the
white supremacist movement).
159. See Beam, supra note 67, at 4.
160. Id. at 3 (describing the deficiencies of the pyramid organization of hate groups).
161. Id. at 4. The assumption is that the like-minded individuals will have a common
goal, i.e., white supremacy, opposition to the federal government, etc. The individuals or
cellular groups of individuals are then expected to respond to messages originating from
many sources, which would presumably include the violent mandates of organized hate
groups with beliefs similar to their own.
162. See Last 3 Victims Pulled from OKC Rubble, CHATrANOOGA FREE PRESS, May
30, 1995.
163. See Katherine Seligman, Lone Wolf Activism; Those Who Once Haunted Hate
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practiced textbook leaderless resistance: he acted with the assistance
of a single accomplice,"6 at least partly in response to the raid on
David Koresh's compound in Waco, Texas."'
In another frightening pattern of leaderless resistance, a fugitive
named Eric Rudolph is believed to have planted several bombs in
public places throughout the Southeast. Rudolph was sought in
connection with at least four bombings: the bombing of Atlanta's
Centennial Park during the 1996 Olympics; the 1997 bombing of a gay
bar in Atlanta; the 1997 bombing of an Atlanta family planning clinic;
and the 1998 bombing of an abortion clinic in Birmingham,
Alabama. 66 Although Rudolph was linked to both the Army of God
and the Christian Identity movement in the past, for several years law
enforcement authorities were unable to use these connections to
locate him. 67
To the extent that tort litigation succeeds in breaking apart hate
groups and the individual members of those hate groups who choose
to commit acts of violence on their own under a strategy of leaderless
resistance, there is a strong argument that decentralizing hate groups
may actually increase rather than decrease the incidence of hate
motivated violence. One of the advantages of organized hate groups
is that they are easier to identify and monitor than are the "lone
wolves"' 1 8 that populate the ranks of leaderless resistance. Hate
groups may come to rely on leaderless resistors in lieu of their own
members for purposes of carrying out violence in accordance with
their rhetoric. What is abundantly clear is that leaderless resistance
allows hate groups to be bolder in their advocacy of violence because
they can expect unaffiliated persons to carry out that violence, rather
than members of their own group. Thus, while the goal of tort
Groups Blend Dangerously Into Society, S.F. CHRON., June 4,2001, at A3.
164. McVeigh's accomplice was Terry Nichols, an old army friend. MORRIS DEES &
JAMES CORCORAN, GATHERING STORM: AMERICA'S MILITIA THREAT 152 (1996); see
also id. at 158-60 (describing the actions McVeigh and Nichols were said to have taken in
preparation for the bombing).
165. See id. at 156 (describing McVeigh's strong reaction to the FBI's raid on David
Koresh's compound in Waco).
166. Quintin Ellison, Bombing Victim Keeps Searching for Justice, ASHEVILLE
CITIZEN-TIMES (Asheville, N.C.), Jan. 29, 2001, at Al.
167. Id. Rudolph was apprehended in May 2003 by a Murphy, North Carolina, police
officer who spotted him looking for food behind a local grocery store. Richard Whitt,
Rudolph Captured: N.C. Mountains Provided Refuge, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 1, 2003,
at lB. He will first stand trial for the abortion clinic bombing that took place in
Birmingham in 1998. See Amended Scheduling Order at 5, United States v. Rudolph, No.
CR-00-S-422-S (N.D. Ala. entered Dec. 30,2003) (scheduling Rudolph's trial for August 2,
2004).
168. See Seligman, supra note 163.
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litigation is to hold hate groups accountable for the outcomes of their
advocacy of violence, it may ultimately function to foster leaderless
resistance, a system of hate-motivated violence in which hate groups
could potentially be totally insulated from liability.
V. THE LEGITIMACY OF HATE GROUP DECENTRALIZATION AS A
GOAL OF TORT LITIGATION

Because there is no archetypal tort case,1 69 there similarly can be
no exclusively acceptable set of goals of tort litigation. If asked to
identify the goals of tort litigation, it is unlikely that legal scholars
would specifically mention the bankrupting and disbanding of hate
groups. It is important, however, to acknowledge that the goals of
tort litigation are not formulated in a vacuum. Rather, those goals
will vary from plaintiff to plaintiff. For example, while an automobile
accident victim might be primarily concerned with receiving
compensation for medical expenses or time lost from work, the
parent of a child who died as a result of medical malpractice might be
more concerned with exacting retribution or ensuring that medical
practices are carried out with more care in the future. 170 Like these
grieving parents, the victims of hate crimes may also be concerned
with exacting retribution and taking actions to ensure that the hate
groups responsible for their injuries will not be able to hurt anyone
else. Decentralization of hate groups as a goal of tort litigation
therefore can be justified in light of both this already accepted tort
litigation goal of retribution and the constitutional rights of tort
litigants to petition the civil courts for a redress of grievances.
It is difficult not to automatically equate the retributive goal of
tort litigation with the primal urge to "get even."''
However, the
retributive goal of tort litigation is defensible on broader and more
constructive grounds. In an article critiquing the law of torts,
Professor Richard Abel identified three general purposes of the body
of law: "to pass moral judgment on what has happened, respond to
17 2
the victim's need for compensation, and encourage future safety.'
169. See SHAPO, supra note 26, 1.01 (noting that "[t]ort cases are as varied as [the]
human activities that create risks of injury").
170. Each of these goals of tort litigation has been acknowledged as legitimate. See
generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 116, at 4-1 to 4-222 (describing the
purposes and goals of tort law); SHAPO, supra note 26, T 71.03 (listing some of the
rationales for compensatory damages).
171. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, The Inadequacies of Civil Society: Law's
Complementary Role in Regulating Harmful Speech, 1 MARGINS 305, 313-18 (2001)

(providing a general discussion of the distinction between retribution and revenge).
172. Richard Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785,791 (1990).
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Each of these purposes is relevant to the context of hate group
accountability for hate crimes,'73 but it is the first purpose, passing
moral judgment on what has happened, that most supports the
legitimacy of hate group decentralization as a goal of tort litigation.
This purpose of tort litigation fully authorizes victims of hate crimes
and their families to call into question the violent and immoral
actions of hate groups and to ask juries, as representatives of the
judgment of the community at large, to condemn those actions by
imposing financially crippling money damages.174 That tort litigants
would desire such an outcome is not a new concept, and it need not
be defended on novel grounds. For example, it would not be
shocking for the parents of a child who died as a result of gross
medical malpractice to seek revocation of the responsible doctor's
medical license, in addition to compensation for the loss of their child.
Analogously, it is not shocking that hate crime victims would file
lawsuits not only to obtain compensation for their damages, but also
to decommission the party responsible for those damages.
While retribution is not often the only goal of a tort lawsuit, it is
oftentimes at least an ancillary goal. The retributive urge has already
been acknowledged, and incorporated to a certain extent, in the
criminal law. 175 Professor Jean Hampton described retributive
punishment as a means of adjusting the relative positions of victims
and wrongdoers after a crime unbalances them. 176 Inherent in this
173. Victim compensation is a central concern of the law of torts in general and to hate
crime victims in particular. See, e.g., VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE
AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 1 (10th ed. 2000) (identifying restoring "injured parties to their
original condition, insofar as the law can do this, by compensating them for their injury" as
one of the four primary purposes of tort law); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
supra note 116, at 4-1 to 4-222 (describing the purposes of tort law); SHAPO, supra note 26,
1.01 (discussing rationales for compensatory damages).
However, the purpose of
encouraging future safety is less relevant in this context. While one could easily make an
argument that decentralizing hate groups makes for a safer environment for those whom
hate groups targeted for violence, the safety-encouraging purpose as articulated by Abel
seems more tailored to the realm of negligence, worker and consumer safety, and product
liability. See Abel, supra note 172, at 808-22 (arguing that the law of torts does a poor job
of encouraging future safety).
174. See Bender, supra note 122, at 259 (discussing tort law's ability to empower
victims to invoke the judgment of community members).
175. See, e.g., Joshua Dressier, Hating Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So
Good Be Wrong? 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451-53 (1990) (discussing the theory of
retributivism as it relates to the criminal law context).
176. See Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 124-28 (1988). Hampton explains that the
retributivist desire for punishment is motivated by something larger than the personal
satisfaction of seeing the offender suffer the consequences of his offense.
A retributivist's commitment to punishment is not merely a commitment to
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general theory of retribution is the idea that punishment should be
'
inflicted on wrongdoers in order to " 'plant the flag' of morality,"177
and thereby facilitate the imposition of moral judgment for its own
sake.
This idea of retributivism also has applications in the civil
context, although it has met with considerable criticism.'78 Opposition
to the retributive goal of tort litigation is largely based on the idea
that such an objective is rooted in a primitive urge for revenge, rather
than in a healthy desire for punishment and deterrence of the
underlying harmful conduct. 79 While this is a sound argument, it fails
to take into account the more constructive application of retribution:
It provides a mediate useful outlet for the community sense of
justice at a level of intensity below that which typically
provokes judgments of crime, and one proportionate to
culpability.... Part of our reason for believing that it will
remain on active service, if sometimes behind the scenes, is
implied in a remark by Sir Arthur Goodhart, a distinguished
English jurisprudence scholar and critic of tort doctrine:
"[W]ithout the sense of retribution we may lose our sense of
wrong. Retribution in punishment is an expression of the
community's disapproval of crime, and if [this] retribution is not
given recognition this disapproval may also disappear. 180
Retribution, then, seems to serve the useful purpose of keeping
society on notice of what is and is not acceptable behavior. Just as
the sense of retribution may motivate a jury to condemn the conduct
of individual criminal defendants as morally wrong, it may similarly
motivate juries to condemn the conduct of hate groups who incite
crimes as morally wrong. The desire to dismember the hate groups
responsible for hate crimes may therefore be included under the
umbrella of the retributive goal of tort litigation.
In a more general sense, hate crime victims as potential tort
litigants may also justify their decentralization goals in light of their
right to court access, as implied by the Petition Clause of the First
taking hubristic wrongdoers down a peg or two; it is also a commitment to
asserting moral truth in the face of its denial. If I have value equal to that of my
assailant, then that must be made manifest after I have been victimized.
Id. at 125.
177. Id. at 130 (quoting C.S. LEWIS, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 45 (1944)).

178. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 116, at 4-171 (describing some of
the arguments opposing the punitive and retributive rationales for tort litigation).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 4-172 to 4-173 (quoting ARTHUR GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND MORAL
LAW 92-93 (1953) (alterations in original)).
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Amendment.181 A primary purpose of the Petition Clause is to
preserve the right of citizens to bring their grievances to the attention
of the government. 82 Recent legal scholarship has explored the
relatively dormant Petition Clause as a means of supporting a general
right of court access.183

In her articles regarding the right of court

access via the Petition Clause, Professor Carol Rice Andrews defined
the right as "[t]he right of an individual or group to file a winning
claim within the court's jurisdiction."'' " Professor Andrews stressed
that her definition of the right of access is narrow in that it protects
185
only the right to access the courts in order to file a winning claim.
As such, plaintiffs are not guaranteed that the courts will respond to
the claim, they are simply guaranteed the right to assert the claim as
an initial matter. As to the "winning" aspect of the definition,
Andrews pointed out that because winning claims have the greatest
potential to achieve the goal of bringing social or political problems
to the attention of the government for the purposes of bringing about
changes in law or solving social problems, they are afforded
protection under the Petition Clause to the exclusion of losing
186
claims.
Part of Professor Andrews's analysis questioned whether a
plaintiff's motive for filing a winning claim should factor into the
determination of whether the claim is protected by the Petition
Clause.187 In discussing whether the right of court access should be
limited by plaintiffs' motives for filing lawsuits, Professor Andrews
specifically addressed the Donald civil case against the United
Klans. 88 She pointed out that Donald and her attorneys may have
had motives for filing the civil claims that would have been
181. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging.., the right of
the people ...to petition the Government for a redress of grievances").
182. See Carol Rice Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A First
Amendment Challenge,61 OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 674 (2000) (arguing that the right to petition
includes petitioning the judiciary, and that this right is supported by the text, history, and
policies of the Petition Clause).
183. See id. (examining the relationship between the Petition Clause and a variety of
laws restricting court access based on motive); see also Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of
Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 691 (1999) (concluding that the Petition Clause includes a right of court
access).
184. Andrews, supra note 182, at 681.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 768 (stating that "[t]he First Amendment protects petitions for the further
reason that they inform the government and thus create the potential for advancement of
the law and cure of societal problems").
187. Id. at 767-68.
188. Id. at 768-70.
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considered improper under some court rules, 189 but she also
acknowledged that society might have been denied beneficial changes
had Donald's right to file her claim depended solely on her motive for
She concluded that, assuming a lawsuit states a winning
doing so.'
claim, it serves the other aims of the Petition Clause irrespective of
the plaintiff's intent to use the process as a weapon.
Winning claims will inform the government of problems, may
advance the state of the law, and may help other persons who might
suffer similar wrongs at the hands of the defendant or others. They
serve these aims even if the plaintiff himself wants to use the
prosecution of his winning claim to harass the defendant. To use the
Klan example, the benefits of ultimately winning would be the same,
regardless of whether the plaintiffs originally intended only to use the
suit as a form of harassment or weapon to harm the Klan.191
Professor Andrews further reasoned that the concept of
neutrality applied to restrictions on the freedom of thought should
also apply to restrictions on the freedom of access to the courts via
the Petition Clause.192 She ultimately concluded that a plaintiff's bad
motive in filing a winning claim does not remove the claim from the
protection of the Petition Clause; so long as the lawsuit advances a
winning claim, it is considered a legitimate exercise of the right of
court access implied by the First Amendment.'9 3
The legitimacy of hate group decentralization as a goal of tort
litigation is thus defensible on two major grounds. First, the goal falls
neatly within the existing retributive rationale for tort litigation.
Under this rationale, tort litigants may pursue their claims for the
purpose of inviting community condemnation of a defendant's
conduct and equalizing the relative positions of hate crime victims
and their assailants. Second, the filing of a winning claim for the
purpose of bringing a social wrong to the attention of policymakers is
an act protected by the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. 9 4
That the motive for filing the claim may be objectively improper is of
no consequence if the claim is likely to succeed in capturing the
attention of policymakers with the power to make changes in
189. Id. at 769 (including among the goals of the Donald litigation "a desire to burden
and destroy the defendant financially.").
190. Id. at 768-69.
191. Id. at 772.
192. Id. at 769 (stating that "[i]mplementation of the Petition Clause, like the Speech
Clause, demands neutrality. Use of motive to restrict exercise of the right to petition
courts creates the risk of imposing community preferences").
193. Id. at 773.
194. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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195
response to it.

CONCLUSION

The
First
Amendment
and
leaderless
resistance
counterarguments are compelling, but not so compelling that they
justify the conclusion that decentralizing hate groups is an illegitimate
and unconstitutional goal of tort litigation. The area of tort law exists
to compensate victims, 19 6 to vindicate their need for retribution,'97 and
to facilitate the imposition of the moral judgment of the
community.'9 8 The decentralization goal of hate crime tort litigants is
entirely reasonable in light of the retributive rationale for tort
litigation and the constitutional right under the Petition Clause to use
the courts to bring grievances to the attention of policymakers.' 9
That tort litigation of this kind has the potential to improperly silence
hate groups is not a strong criticism because the assets of the groups
cannot be reached by a civil judgment unless something more than
mere protected speech is alleged to have given rise to the commission
of violence. As such, there is no true threat to protected speech.
Finally, while it is possible that decentralizing hate groups will drive
more extremists to commit violent acts of leaderless resistance, it is
also quite possible that breaking apart hate groups will actually result
in a decline in such violence. Because extremists who engage in this
highly unpredictable form of violence tend to "draw ideological
inspiration from"?°° more organized terrorist or hate groups,
decentralizing these groups may in fact staunch the flow of the hateful
ideologies that inspire violent leaderless resistance.
In sum, hate crime victims who make it a goal of their civil
lawsuits to disband the hate groups ultimately responsible for
motivating the crimes committed against them should not be
dismissed as merely vindictive. The desire of victims to play a part in
bringing to justice all parties responsible for their victimization is a
natural and constructive one, and there are no solid legal or social
grounds on which to altogether condemn it. While this use of tort

195. See Andrews, supra note 182, at 773.
196. See Abel, supra note 172, at 791 (describing victim compensation as a purpose of
tort litigation).
197. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 116, at 4-171.
198. See Bender, supra note 122, at 259.
199. See supra notes 181-95 and accompanying text (describing the right of court
access implied by the Petition Clause of the First Amendment).
200. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1999, at 25 (1999),
availableat www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror99.pdf.

1166

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

litigation may never permeate the civil system, it should be allowed to
stand as a valid complement to the relief granted hate crime victims
by the criminal legal system.
DESIRt EDWARDS

